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Abstract  
In image classification of deep learning, adversarial examples where inputs intended to add small 
magnitude perturbations may mislead deep neural networks (DNNs) to incorrect results, which means 
DNNs are vulnerable to them. Different attack and defense strategies have been proposed to better 
research the mechanism of deep learning. However, those research in these networks are only for one 
aspect, either an attack or a defense, not considering that attacks and defenses should be interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing, just like the relationship between spears and shields. In this paper, we 
propose Cycle-Consistent Adversarial GAN (CycleAdvGAN) to generate adversarial examples, which 
can learn and approximate the distribution of original instances and adversarial examples. For 
CycleAdvGAN, once the Generator A  and D  are trained, AG can generate adversarial perturbations 
efficiently for any instance, so as to make DNNs predict wrong, and DG  recovery adversarial examples 
to clean instances, so as to make DNNs predict correct. We apply CycleAdvGAN under semi-white 
box and black-box settings on two public datasets MNIST and CIFAR10. Using the extensive 
experiments, we show that our method has achieved the state-of-the-art adversarial attack method and 
also efficiently improve the defense ability, which make the integration of adversarial attack and 
defense come true. In additional, it has improved attack effect only trained on the adversarial dataset 
generated by any kind of adversarial attack. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) rapid development, they have achieved great successes in 
various tasks handling the image recognition[1], text processing[2] and speech recognition[3]. Despite 
the great success, DNNs have been proved to be vulnerable and susceptible to adversarial example[4], 
the carefully crafted samples looking similar to natural images but designed to mislead a pretrained 
model. On the one hand, adversarial example leads to potential security threats by attacking or 
misleading the practical deep learning applications, for example mistaking a stop sign for a yield sign[5] 
when auto driving, and a thief for a staff when face recognition[6]. On the other hand, adversarial 
examples are also valuable and beneficial to not only the deep learning models but also the machine 
learning model, as they can enhance the robust of  models and provide insights into their strengths, 
weaknesses, and blind-spots[7]. 
CycleAdvGAN: integration of adversarial attack and defence 
 
2 
The strategy to generate adversarial examples is to intentionally add imperceptible perturbations to 
clean instances, for fooling DNNs to make wrong predictions. In the past years, various attack 
algorithms have been developed to produce adversarial examples in the white-box manner with the 
knowledge of the structure and parameters of a given model, including gradient based algorithms such 
as fast gradient sign method[8] and iterative variants of gradient-based methods[9], optimization-based 
methods such  as box-constrained LBFGS[4] and Carlini and Wagner Attacks[10], and network-based 
methods such as AdvGAN[11] and Natural GAN[12]. At the same time, defense algorithms have 
progress with advances in attack algorithms, including adversarial training that retrains a neural 
network to predict correct labels for adversarial examples[8], defensive distillation that migrate 
knowledge of complex networks to simple networks[13], and network-based defense that add 
additional network to detecting or denoising[14]. Network-based techniques have achieved satisfying 
performance not only in terms of attacks but also defenses owning to their great power for generating 
high-quality synthetic data and detecting these subtle differences to distinguish between adversarial 
and clean examples. However, existing attack methods exhibit low efficacy when attacking black-box 
models. For example, most of existing methods, such as FGSM and optimization methods, cannot 
successfully attack them in the black-box manner, due to the poor transferability[15].Meanwhile, 
existing defense methods also exist poor transferability, as they only can defense certain attack method. 
On the other hand, in the previous white-box attacks, the adversary needs to have white-box access to 
the architecture and parameters of the model all the time. 
In addition, those study in these networks are only for one aspect, either an attack or a defense, not 
considering that attacks and defenses should be interdependent and mutually reinforcing, just like the 
relationship between spears and shields. Inspired by the idea of GAN, just as the generative model is 
pitted against an adversary, if then we train a model consisted of attack and defense, and the attacker 
and defender are also fighting against each other all the time, it can improve the attack ability as well 
as the defense ability. Besides, it can also improve the transferability, because of better learning the 
latent distribution of adversarial examples and clean instances. Consequently, utilizing the cycle-
consistence idea of CycleGAN[16], we apply a similar paradigm to combine the attacker and defender, 
which promote each other. In this paper, we propose to train a Cycle-Consistent Adversarial 
GAN(CycleAdvGAN) to achieve the integration of adversarial attack and defense. Once trained, there 
is no need to access to the target model itself anymore no matter in the manner of attack or defense, 
and the CycleAdvGAN can generate perturbations and recovery the adversarial examples such that the 
resulting example must be realistic according to a discriminator network. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our strategy CycleAdvGAN, we experiment on different datasets 
including MNIST and CIFAR10 for an ensemble of target models. We evaluate these attack strategies 
in both semi-white box and black-box settings. We show that adversarial examples generated by 
CycleAdvGAN have higher success rates in both semi-white box and black-box attacks and also has 
good effect in defense, due to the fact that attack and defense promote each other, better leaning the 
distinguish between adversarial example and clean example. In summary, we make the following 
contributions as follows: 
⚫ We are the first to achieve the integration of adversarial attack and defense by preserving a 
high success rate of attacks as well as defenses. 
⚫ We demonstrate a powerful capability of transferability no matter in the manner of attack or 
defense. 
⚫ We indirectly demonstrate the adversarial and clean data are not twins, subjecting to two 
different distributions. 
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2 RELATED WORK 
2.1 Adversarial attack with GAN 
A number of methods been proposed can successfully generate adversarial examples in the white-box 
manner, where the adversary has full access to the classifier. A more straightforward approach is to 
change pixels value simultaneously in the direction of the gradient. And another method is to utilized 
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) as part of their approach to generate adversarial examples 
which made adversarial examples more natural to human. [11] proposed AdvGAN to generate 
adversarial examples with generative adversarial networks (GANs), which can learn and approximate 
the distribution of original instances. Once trained, the feed-forward generator can produce adversarial 
perturbations efficiently. However, they only generate perturbation by add loss to make target model 
predict wrong, instead of considering the relationship between different adversarial attack methods. 
2.2 Defense to Adversarial examples with GAN 
So far, there are two main ideas to defend against adversarial attack. A more straightforward approach 
is to make the model more robust by enhancing training data or adjusting learning strategies, such as 
adversarial training and defensive distillation. The second is a series of detection mechanisms for 
detecting and rejecting against the examples. One important way in the second method is to utilize 
GAN to defense adversarial examples[14], with the advantage to learn the latent distribution of 
perturbation and reconstruct clean samples better. [17] propose a framework for reconstructing images 
based on GAN using adversarial examples to generate clean samples similar to the original samples. 
First, the original sample and the adversarial example training are used to generate the GAN. After the 
training, the adversarial example and the original sample are first passed through the generator to 
eliminate the adversarial perturbations, and then the target classifier is classified. The author consider 
that the misclassification of the adversarial examples is mainly caused by some pixel-level intentional 
imperceptible perturbation of the input image, so it is desirable to propose an algorithm to eliminate 
the adversarial perturbations of the input image, thereby achieving the purpose of defending against 
the attack. 
2.3 Adversarial and Clean Examples Are Not Twins 
There are different viewpoints why adversarial examples exist because of the unexplained nature of 
DNNs[18]–[20].However, it is widely accepted that the linear properties of deep neural networks in 
high latitude space are sufficient to generate adversarial attack[8]. There is also a guess that adversarial 
examples and clean samples are subject to two independent distributions[21], which makes style 
transfer between the two data possible. To use domain adaptation for style transfer, [16] proposed 
CycleGAN for learning to translate an image from a source domain X to a target domain Y in the 
absence of paired examples. The training procedure requires a set of style images in the same style and 
a set of target images of similar content. The learned mapping function takes one target image as input 
and transforms it into the style domain. 
3 Integration of Adversarial Attack and Defense 
In this section, we will first introduce the problem definition, and then briefly descript two approaches 
we utilized to generate adversarial images, at last elaborate the framework, formulation and 
corresponding network architecture of our proposed Cycle-Consistent Adversarial GAN 
(CycleAdvGAN). 
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3.1 Problem Definition 
Let 
nA R be the clean feature space, with n  the number of features. Suppose that ( , )i ia t  is the i th 
instance within the clean dataset, which is comprised of feature vectors 
ia A  , generated according 
to some unknown distribution i Aa P  , and it  the corresponding true class labels.  
Let 
nB R be the adversarial feature space, with n  the number of features. Supposing ( , )i ib l  is the i
th instance within the adversarial dataset, which is comprised of feature vectors ib B  , generated 
according to some unknown distribution Bib P  , and il  the corresponding predict labels.  
The learning model aims to mapping functions between two domains A and B given training samples  
1{ }i i
Na =  where ia A  within the clean dataset and 1{ }i i
Mb = where ib B  within the adversarial dataset. 
We denote the data distribution as i Aa P  and Bib P . Given an instance ia  , the goal of the Generator 
A( AG ) is to generate adversarial example ib , which is classified as ( )i iF b t  (untargeted attack), 
where t  denotes the true label. And given an adversarial examples ib  , the goal of the Generator D( DG ) 
is to recover ib  to clean instance ia , which is classified as ( )i iF a t= , where t  denotes the true label. 
ib  should also be close to the original instance ia  in terms of 2L  or other distance metric. 
 
(a) the attack part of the architecture
 
(b) the defense part of the architecture 
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Figure1. The framework of CycleAdvGAN consists of two generator AG  and DG , two discriminator 
aD and bD , and attacking a target model F . 
3.2 Methods Generating Adversarial Examples 
In this subsection, two approaches we utilized to generate adversarial examples as the training set are 
provided with a brief description. 
Fast Gradient Sign Method Attack (FGSM). Goodfellow et al. proposed a fast method called Fast 
Gradient Sign Method to generate adversarial examples [8]. They only performed one step gradient 
update along the direction of the sign of gradient at each pixel. Their perturbation can be expressed as: 
( )( ), ,cp sign J I l=   
where  is the magnitude of the perturbation. The generated adversarial example advx  is calculated as: 
advx x p= + . This perturbation can be computed by using back-propagation. They claimed that the 
linear part of the high dimensional deep neural network could not resist adversarial examples, although 
the linear behavior speeded up training. Regularization approaches are used in deep neural networks 
such as dropout. Pre-training could not improve the robustness of networks. 
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). Kurakin et al. applied adversarial examples to the physical world [9]. 
They extended Fast Gradient Sign method by running a finer optimization (smaller change) for multiple 
iterations. In each iteration, they clipped pixel values to avoid large change on each pixel: 
( ) 1 ( , ,i ipip psignI Clip I J I l + = +   
where Clip limits the change of the generated adversarial image in each iteration. 
3.3 The CycleAdvGAN Method 
Figure 1 illustrates the overall architecture of CycleAdvGAN including two mappings :AG A B→  and 
:DG B A→ , which is mainly consists of five parts: the generator AG , the generator DG , the 
discriminator aD  , the discriminator bD  , and the target neural network F . Here the generator AG  
takes the original instance a   as its input and generates perturbation ( )AG a . Then ( )fake ab a G a= +  
will be sent to the discriminator bD , which is used to distinguish the generated data and the adversarial 
example b . bD  encourages AG  to translate A  into outputs indistinguishable from domain B . As 
shown in Figure 1(a) and (b), the two part of the architecture are symmetrical. Therefore, the generator 
DG  takes the adversarial example b  as its input and generates a perturbation ( )DG b . Then 
( )Dfakea b G b= +  will be sent to the discriminator aD , which is used to distinguish the generated data 
and the original instance a . aD  encourages BG  to translate B  into outputs indistinguishable from 
domain A . To fulfill the goal of fooling the learning model, we perform the white-box attack, where 
the target model is F in this case. F  takes fakeb  and fakea as its input and outputs its loss advL , which 
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represents the distance between the prediction and the target class t  (targeted attack), or the opposite 
of the distance between the prediction and the ground truth class (untargeted attack).  
Adversarial loss for AG . We apply adversarial losses to both mapping functions. For the mapping 
function :AG A B→  and its discriminator aD ,we express the objective as:  
( , ) [ ( ( ))] [ (1 ( ( )))]
A B AG A B b P B a P B A
L G D E log D b E log D G a = + −  
where generator AG  aims to generate imperceptible perturbation ( )AG a  that added to a  for looking 
similar to original instance , while bD  aims to distinguish between generated adversarial example and 
adversarial example. 
Adversarial loss for BG . We introduce a similar adversarial loss for the mapping function 
:DG B A→ .The loss is defined as: 
( , ) [ ( ( ))] [ (1 ( ( )))]
B A BG B a P A bD DP A
L G D E log D a E log D G b = + −  
where generator BG  aims to recover adversarial example b to clean example, while aD  aims to 
distinguish between generated clean example and clean example. 
Cycle Consistency Loss. After competing with discriminator aD in the minmax game, AG  should be 
able to generate visually realistic adversarial examples. However, since no pairwise supervision is 
provided, the deblurred image may not retain the content information in the original blurred image. 
Inspired by CycleGAN for style transfer which is shown to imply the cycle-consistency constraints, 
we also introduce variants of cycle consistency losses to ensure the successful of integration of 
adversarial attack and defense. The adversarial loss constrains the output of G after added to input to 
look like the instance in transfer domain. However, adversarial losses alone cannot guarantee that the 
learned function can map an individual input a  to a desired output b .To further generate the specific 
perturbation, we attempt to add cycle consistence loss to the architecture. The loss is defined as: 
1 1[|| ( ( )) || ] [|| ( ( )) || ]A Bcyc a P A b DPD AL E G G a a E G G b b = − + −  
Adversarial loss for F . The loss for fooling the target model f in an untargeted attack is: 
[ ( , )] [ ( , )]
A Badv a P F fake t b P F fake c
L E L b l E L a l = +  
where tl is the target label and cl represents the true class. Meanwhile, FL  denotes the loss function 
(e.g., cross-entropy loss) used to train the original model F . The advL  losses encourages the perturbed 
image to be misclassified and the recovered instance to be correctly classified. 
Total Loss. We optimize a min-max objective function , , ,min maxA B A BG G F D D L , where the loss L  is 
defined as: 
2 3 41 BAD cyc adD v
L L L L L   = + + +   
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1  , 2 , 3 and 4  are the weights to balance the multiple objectives. The next section will provide 
more training details and discuss the appropriate weights. 
4 Implementation 
Network Architecture. Next, we briefly introduce the network architectures in our CycleAdvGAN 
framework. We adopt the variant architecture for our generator and discriminator from Zhu et al. who 
have shown impressive results for neural style transfer in the absence of paired examples. 
Generator. This generator network contains two stride-2 convolutions, several residual blocks, and 
two strided-2 deconvolutions. we employ the Resnet architecture in our generator, which allows low-
level information to shortcut across the network, leading to better results. We use 4 blocks for 28×28 
Lenet5 images and 4 blocks for 32×32 cifar10. The encoder-decoder architecture consists of: 
Encoder: C8-C16-C32 
Decoder: C32-C16-C8 
Discriminator. For the discriminator networks, we use three stride-2 convolutions. The last layer of 
discriminator network is fed into a linear layer to generate a 1-dimensional output, followed by a 
Sigmoid function.  Our discriminator architecture is: 
C8-C16-C32 
A B 
Conv1(32,3,3)+Relu Conv1(32,3,3)+Relu 
Max Pooling Conv1(32,3,3)+Relu 
Conv1(64,3,3)+Relu Max Pooling 
Max Pooling Dropout(0.5) 
FC(200)+Relu FC(128)+Relu 
FC(10) Dropout(0.5) 
 FC(10) 
Table 1. Target model architectures for the MNIST. A are the LENET5.B are the LENET5 with dropout. 
Target Model. For the target model, we trained different models on MNIST[22] and CIFAR10[23] 
respectively. For MNIST, in all of our experiments, we generate adversarial examples for three models 
whose architectures are shown in Table1. For CIFAR-10, we select ResNet-18[24] and VGG-16[25] 
for our experiments. We show the classification accuracy of pristine MNIST and CIFAR10 test data in 
Table 2. The targeted models F  could be any given deep networks with the last two layers accessible 
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(e.g., Soft-max layer and the layer before it). These two layers are used as a part of 
advL . To perform 
adversarial attack, the loss 
advL  encourages the adversarial example b   to be misclassified by F and 
the clean examples a  to be correctly classified by F . 
Model 
MNIST CIFAR-10 
A B Resnet-18 VGG-16 
Classification 
Accuracy 
98.85 99.14 85 84 
Table 2. Classification accuracy rates (%) of benign input for different target models trained by us on 
MNSIT and CIFAR10.  
Training details. Our code and models will be available upon publication. We apply the loss in Carlini 
& Wagner [10]as our loss max(max ( ) ( ) , )adv i t A i A i
FL F x F x k= −  , where t  is the target class, and F   
represents the target network in the semi-white box setting. We set the confidence 0k =  and use Adam 
as our solver [26]. For GANL , as same as the Zhu et.al, we replace the negative log likelihood objective 
by a least-squares loss. This loss is more stable during training and generates higher quality results. In 
particular, for a GAN loss ( , , , )GANL G D A B , we train the G 
2[( ( ( ))-1) ]
Aa P
D G xE  to minimize and train 
the D to minimize 
2 2[( ( ) 1) ] [ ( ( )) ]
B Ab P a P
E D b E D G x − + . 
Implementation Details. In our experiments, we use Pytorch for the implementation and test them on 
a NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU cluster in Nvidia DGX station. We train CycleAdvGAN for 100 epochs 
with a batch size of 64, with the learning rate of 0.01, decreased by 10% every 20 steps.  
5 Experimental results 
In this section, we first evaluate CycleAdvGAN for both semi-white box and black-box settings on 
MNIST and CIFAR10. We then apply CycleAdvGAN to generate adversarial examples on different 
target models and test the attack success rate for them. Meanwhile we also recover adversarial 
examples to clean instances and test the recovery success rate for them and show that our method can 
achieve higher attack success rates as well as the higher recovery success rates. We use the 
classification accuracy to measure attacking performance and defending performance with the lower 
accuracy indicating better attacking performance and the higher accuracy indicating better defending 
performance. We generate all adversarial examples for different attack methods based on the L  bound 
as 0.3 on MNIST and 0.03 on CIFAR10. 
5.1 CycleAdvGAN in semi-white box setting 
In semi-white box condition, there is no need to access the original target model after the generator is 
trained, in contrast to traditional white-box condition. First, we apply different architectures for the 
target model F  for MNIST and with ResNet-18 and VGG-16 for CIFAR10. We apply CycleAdvGAN 
to perform semi-white box setting against each model on MNIST dataset and CIFAR10 dataset. From 
the performance of semi-white box setting (classification accuracy rate) in Table 3, we can see that 
CycleAdvGAN is able to generate adversarial instances to attack all models with high attack success 
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rate compared to other state-of-the-art attacks. Meanwhile, from the performance of semi-white box 
condition (defense with DG ) in Table 3, we can also see that CycleAdvGAN is able to recover 
adversarial examples to clean samples, so as to significantly improve classification accuracy rates. 
Efficiently proved by this, our proposed CycleAdvGAN can achieve the integration of adversarial 
attack and defense. 
As shown in the Table 3, we further analyze that in the MNIST dataset, it can be seen that B architecture 
has better resistance against adversarial attack, especially for FGSM method. This is because dropout 
[27] was added to B architecture, which can enhance the robustness of neural network. Attacking 
ability and defending ability is highly correlated with the capacity of the learning model generating the 
adversarial examples. For example, adversarial generated by B show good attacking performance on 
A and after defending with DG , A has a better classification accuracy performance, because B usually 
owns more complicated network structure with dropout and thus better capability than A in practice. 
And our proposed method can greatly increase the attack rate, because our network learns the potential 
distribution of adversarial examples. Meanwhile, it can be seen that the CycleAdvGAN trained by the 
training set of adversarial examples crafted by FGSM and BIM have a higher attack rate than the 
original attack method through its attack mechanism, and can greatly improve its classification 
accuracy rate through the defense mechanism. 
Method 
MNIST CIFAR-10 
A B Resnet-18 VGG-16 
FGSM 6.12 10.53 10.27  13.2 
FGSM 
(attack with AG ) 
2.54 1.27 5.2 3.6 
FGSM 
(defense with DG ) 
98.12 92.45 54.8 43.8 
BIM  0.76 1.1 8.96  8.97 
BIM 
(attack with AG ) 
0.6 0.43 1.98 2.6 
BIM 
(defense with DG ) 
94.6 93.15 44.8 38.6 
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Table 3. Classification accuracy rates of adversarial examples crafted by FGSM, BIM and 
CycleAdvGAN. FGSM (attack with 
AG ) and FGSM (defense with DG ) means that we train the 
CycleAdvGAN with the adversarial examples crafted by FGSM. The lower accuracy indicates better 
attacking performance. The higher accuracy indicates better defending performance. 
5.2  CycleAdvGAN in black-box setting 
In this section, we evaluate the transferability of the CycleAdvGAN in the black-box attacking settings. 
In black-box attacks, we train the CycleAdvGAN in certain target models and optimize the generator 
accordingly. Once the CycleAdvGAN trained, we generate adversarial examples or recover them 
through the 
aG  and DG . Table 4 and Table 5 respectively shows the classification accuracy of MNIST 
and CIFAR10 datasets, when transferring attacks between different classification models. The 
transferability performance is marked red in Table 4 in MNIST dataset, from which we can get the 
following conclusions: 
⚫ Adversarial examples generated by CycleAdvGAN have very encouraging transferability among 
different target models, which means attack by our CycleAdvGAN can perform quite well in 
black-box setting. 
⚫ After defending with DG , the classification accuracy rates have been significantly improved even 
source and target model are different, which means defense by our CycleAdvGAN also can 
perform quite well in black-box setting. 
⚫ From the above two points, our proposed CycleAdvGAN method can effectively be applied to 
practical. 
Source 
 
Target 
A 
FGSM BIM AG (FGSM) AG (BIM) 
B 
Without DG  46.530 28 34 24 
Defense with DG  98 97 * * 
Table 4. Classification accuracy of adversarial examples generated by different methods transferred 
between different models on MNIST. AG (FGSM) means that we train the CycleAdvGAN with the 
adversarial examples crafted by FGSM. 
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Target 
 
Source 
ResNet-18 
FGSM BIM AG (FGSM) AG (BIM) 
VGG-16 
Without DG  32.6 19.7 23.48 13.6 
Defense with DG  43.1 33.7 * * 
Table 5. Classification accuracy of adversarial examples generated by different methods transferred 
between different models on CIFAR10. 
5.3 High Transferability of Adversarial Examples Analysis 
To interpret why CycleAdvGAN demonstrates better transferability, we further examine the update 
directions given by BIM and CycleAdvGAN along the iterations. We calculate the cosine similarity of 
two successive perturbations and show the results in Table 7 when attacking MNIST and CIFAR10 
dartasets. The update direction of CycleAdvGAN is more stable than that of BIM due to the larger 
value of cosine similarity in CycleAdvGAN. Recall that the transferability comes from the fact that 
models better learn the distribution of adversarial examples rather than perturbation to a certain sample, 
resulting in better transferability for black-box attacks. Another interpretation is that the GAN can 
reconstruct images naturally, which may be helpful for the transferability. 
 FGSM BIM CycleAdvGAN 
cosine similarity 0.3072 0.35 0.44 
Table 6. The cosine similarity of three successive perturbations in FGSM, BIM and CycleAdvGAN. 
The results are averaged over 10000 images. 
5.4  The better efficient of Generating adversarial examples 
In general, as shown in Table 3, CycleAdvGAN has obvious advantages on the integration of 
adversarial attack and defense over other white-box and black-box methods. For instance, regarding 
computation efficiency, CycleAdvGAN performs much faster than others even including the efficient 
FGSM in attack, although CycleAdvGAN needs extra training time to train the generator. Besides, 
FGSM and optimization methods can only perform white-box attack, while CycleAdvGAN is able to 
attack in semi-white box setting. 
 FGSM BIM CycleAdvGAN(attack) CycleAdvGAN(defense) 
Run time 1.734s 18.436s 0.52s 0.53s 
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Table 7. Comparison with the state-of-the-art attack methods. Run time is measured for generating 
1,0000 adversarial instances during test time. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed CycleAdvGAN to generate adversarial examples and recovery 
adversarial examples in cycle-consistency. More importantly, we show that the proposed objective is 
enhancing both the attack effect and the defense effect through the integration of adversarial attack and 
defense. We show that it can improve attack effect only trained on the adversarial dataset generated by 
corresponding adversarial attack method.  
Further, in our CycleAdvGAN framework, once trained, the generator 
AG  can produce adversarial 
perturbations and generator 
BG  can eliminate adversarial perturbation both efficiently. In addition, the 
CycleAdvGAN can work with other attacks or defense strategies, not conflict with other existing 
frameworks. It can also perform both semi-white box and black-box settings with high attack success 
rate as well as defense rate. 
More importantly, we demonstrated that the adversarial and clean data are not twins, subjecting to two 
different distributions. Consequently, the CycleAdvGAN can better learn the latent distribution of them, 
instead of targeting special image, so as to improve transferability. Significant transfer performances 
achieved by our crafted perturbations can pose substantial threat to the deep learned systems in terms 
of black-box attacking. Therefore, it is an important research direction to be focused on in order to 
build reliable deep learning systems. 
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